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Making Pregnancy Work:
Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's
Capacity-Based Model
Joanna L. Grossmant and Gillian L. Thomastt

ABSTRACT: This Article considers the gaps and obstacles in current law
faced by the pregnant woman whose job duties may conflict with pregnancy's
physical effects. While there is no inherent conflict between pregnancy and
work, women in physically strenuous or hazardous occupations, from nursing
to law enforcement, routinely confront situations in which they are physically
unable to perform aspects of their job or, though physically able, seek to avoid
certain tasks because of the potential risks to maternal or fetal health. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) broadly protects against
pregnancy discrimination, but it provides absolute rights only to the extent a
pregnant woman is able to work at full capacity, uninterrupted by pregnancy's
physical effects. To the extent that the law grants affirmative rights to the
pregnant worker with temporary physical limitations, such as the right to
workplace accommodation, it is only on a comparative basis-that is, only to
the extent those rights already are provided to similarly situated temporarily
disabled employees. In this way, pregnancy continues to inhibit equal
employment opportunity for millions of women, three decades after the PDA's
passage.
After briefly examining the medical literature documenting the conflicts
between pregnancy and certain kinds of work, as well as the law as applied to
pregnant workers who are fully capable or fully incapable due to the effects of
pregnancy or childbirth, we consider the predicament of women in physically
demanding fields whose work capacity is partially diminished by pregnancy.
We focus here on the problem of access to light-duty work-temporary
alternative job assignments that accommodate the pregnant worker's
limitations. Without such accommodation, the pregnant firefighter or home
t Professor, Hofstra Law School. B.A. Amherst College; J.D. Stanford Law School. My thanks to
Pamela Holland and Frank Salamone for assistance with research.
tt Senior Staff Attorney, Legal Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund). B.A.
Yale College; J.D. University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Deborah Karpatkin for her
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health care aide whose doctor directs her to avoid heavy lifting or other tasks is
faced with a Hobson's choice: ignore medical advice and continue to perform
all job duties, or stop working altogether, usually sacrificing wages and other
benefits for several months. We describe the limits of the existing PDA
framework for protecting these pregnant workers, and suggest litigation
strategies for maximizing pregnant workers' rights under current law. These
include refraining the "similarly situated" analysis for disparate treatment
challenges to light-duty policies, and exploring the untapped potential of the
disparate impact theory in the light-duty context.

IN TRODUCTION .............................................................................................
I. PREGNANT W OMEN AND W ORK .................................................................

16

II. THE LAW'S CURRENT RESPONSE TO PREGNANCY IN THE WORKPLACE ......
III. THE CAPACITY-BASED MODEL OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ............
A. Full Capacity: The Right To Work ............................................
B. Limited or No Capacity: The Right To Leave Under Some
C ircum stances ...........................................................................
C. Partial Capacity: The Right to Necessary Accommodations? .........
1. The Need for Light Duty ......................................................
2. Disparate Treatment and the "Similarly Situated" Trap ...........
3. Disparate Impact: Untapped Potential ..................................
a. Lochren v. County of Suffolk: A Win for Disparate
Impact ..........................................................................
b. Other Courts Have Left the Door Open .........................

22
26
26

C ON CLUSION .................................................................................................

19

27
30
31
33
41
43
44
49

INTRODUCTION

Though sometimes considered a thing of the past, the inequality faced by
pregnant workers continues to warrant attention. Women make up nearly half
of the workforce, and eighty-five percent of working women will become
mothers at some point during their working lives.' Women also work longer
while pregnant and return to work sooner after childbirth than ever before.2 Yet
many workplaces remain difficult for pregnant workers to navigate.
1. See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, ALFRED J. KAHN & PAUL KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND
WORKING WOMEN 5, 7 (1983); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Quick Stats 2007, www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm
(reporting that women accounted for forty-six percent of the total labor force in 2007).
2. KRISTIN SMITH, BARBARA DOWNS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MATERNITY
LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS: 1961-1995, at 19 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/

prod/2001pubs/p70-79.pdf.
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Pregnancy discrimination claims have been rising at a faster rate in the last
ten years than other types of discrimination claims. 3 The rise in claims-and
the millions of dollars paid out in responsea--suggests the persistence of
unlawful treatment of pregnant women at work. Though pregnancy
discrimination became illegal more than three decades ago, employers continue
to indulge "biases about both the abilities of pregnant women and their proper
roles in the workplace and in the home." 5 The EEOC's current pregnancy
discrimination lawsuit against financial services and media giant Bloomberg
L.P., which at least fifty-eight women have joined as plaintiffs, 6 is a vivid
illustration of bias persisting at the highest echelons. A report that the nation's
largest maternity-clothes retailer settled a charge of refusing to hire pregnant
applicants for $375,000 is equally telling. 7
As important as the persistence of unlawful discrimination, however, are
the gaps in current law faced by the pregnant woman whose job duties may
conflict with the physical effects of pregnancy. How should the law account for
a pregnant woman who is healthy and eager to work, but in need of
accommodations because she is temporarily unable to perform her job at full
capacity? Pregnant workers routinely confront situations in which they are
physically unable to perform aspects of their job or, though physically able,
seek to avoid risks to maternal or fetal health. These conflicts have steadily
increased as women have entered the workforce in large numbers, and even
more so as they have sought to enter physically strenuous or hazardous jobs
traditionally reserved for men.
Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 8 rights are
granted or withheld based primarily on a pregnant woman's capacity to work.
3. The EEOC reports a forty percent increase in charges related to pregnancy between 1997 and
2007, on top of a ten percent increase between 1992 and 1996. See EEOC, Pregnancy Discrimination
Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2007 (Feb. 26, 2008), http://eeoc.gov/stats/

pregnanc.html [hereinafter EEOC, FY 1997-FY 2007]; EEOC, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges:
EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992-FY 1996 (Jan. 31, 2007), http://eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc-a.html.

4. Monetary benefits paid out annually through EEOC conciliations (not including litigation)
increased dramatically in the last decade, from $5.6 to a whopping $30 million between 1997 and 2007.
EEOC, FY 1997-FY 2007, supra note 3.
5. NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: WHERE WE

STAND 30 YEARS LATER 10 (2008), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/
Pregnancy-Discrimination Act- -Where_We_Stand_30_YearsL.pdf ("What is striking is how
frequently cases involve straightforward violations of the [law] that seem to be fueled by a fundamental
resistance to having pregnant women in the workplace, or having to accommodate the needs of pregnant
women.").
6. Alan Feuer, 54 More Women Accuse Bloomberg Firm of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2008, at BI;
Press Release, EEOC, Bloomberg L.P. Sued for Pregnancy Bias (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/
press/9-27-07.html.
7. Press Release, EEOC, Maternity Store Giant To Pay $375,000 To Settle EEOC Pregnancy
Discrimination
and Retaliation
Lawsuit (Jan.
8,
2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-8
-07.html.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). As an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
PDA only protects women who work for employers with at least fifteen employees. See id. § 2000e(b).
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The law broadly protects against "pregnancy discrimination," in that it does not
generally permit employers to take adverse action against a woman because she
is pregnant or to make stereotyped assumptions about a pregnant woman's
inability to carry out certain tasks. These proscriptions undeniably opened
many doors for pregnant women. But the PDA provides absolute rights only to
the extent a pregnant woman is able to work at full capacity, uninterrupted by
the physical effects of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
Moreover, to the extent that the PDA does grant the pregnant worker
affirmative rights, such as a right to workplace accommodation of pregnancy's
temporary physical limitations, it does so only on a comparative basis-that is,
only to the extent those rights are already provided to "similarly situated"
temporarily disabled employees. An employer who fires rather than
accommodates an employee because she suffers a full or partial temporary loss
in capacity due to pregnancy unquestionably acts "because of' pregnancy, and
yet often remains within the bounds of the law so long as non-pregnant
employees with similar incapacity, in need of similar accommodation, would
also be fired. In this way, the capacity-based pregnancy discrimination
framework fails to account for the actual effects of pregnancy on women's
bodies and thus fails to meet the needs of many pregnant working women
today, especially those who labor in hazardous jobs that require physical
strength or exertion.
This Article considers the way current law treats conflicts between
pregnancy and work and how pregnant working women might better navigate
obstacles to their equal participation in the workplace. Part I considers the array
of conflicts between pregnancy and work, illustrated both by scientific studies
about the effects of work on maternal and fetal health and the situations that
tend to engender pregnancy discrimination litigation. Part II describes the basic
legal protections for pregnant workers: the right not to be presumed incapable,
the right to work if capable, and the right, in some circumstances, to unpaid
leave for pregnancy or childbirth-related disability. Finally, Part III analyzes
how these sources of protection apply to different categories of pregnant
workers: the fully capable, the fully incapable, and the partially capable. It
discusses the substantive rights pregnant workers have when occupying each
category, with an emphasis on the gaps in protection for women with partial
capacity. With respect to partial capacity, we focus on the problem of access to
light-duty work-temporary alternative job assignments that accommodate
some of the physical effects of pregnancy. We consider typical employer
policies governing light-duty assignments and the legal challenges mounted
against them. We describe the limits of the current statutory framework,
particularly as interpreted by some courts, for protecting pregnant workers who
need light duty in order to be able to continue working. These limitations stem
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from the PDA's directive that pregnant women's rights are determined
primarily by reference to rights granted similarly situated workers. Finally, we
propose litigation strategies that hold promise for practitioners and the pregnant
women they represent. We suggest a refraining of the "similarly situated"
analysis for disparate treatment challenges to light-duty policies, and explore
the untapped potential of the disparate impact theory in the light-duty context.
I. PREGNANT WOMEN AND WORK

As a general matter, pregnant women are physically able to engage in paid
work, just as they are able (and, indeed, need) to continue with other aspects of
life. In fact, the Council on Scientific Affairs has recommended since 1984 that
women without unusual complications "should be able to continue productive
work until the onset of labor." 9 However, while many women safely work at
full capacity throughout pregnancy and resume work almost immediately after
giving birth, pregnant women may experience conflicts between their physical
condition and job requirements. Pregnancy can impose real, if temporary
limitations on a woman's ability to perform certain work-related tasks, either in
the form of physical impossibility (for example, temporarily being unable to
meet a law enforcement running speed requirement), or avoidance guided by
potential risk to mother or fetus (for example, a doctor's restriction on lifting
heavy objects or exposure to contagions). Whether any particular pregnant
woman is capable of performing some or all of her assigned tasks depends
upon her particular medical condition and the nature of her job.
Scientific researchers identify three basic areas of potential conflict
between work and pregnancy. First, environmental conditions may make work
hazardous to some or all pregnant women, such as exposure to "hazardous
chemicals, gas, dust, fumes, radiation, or infectious disease."' 0 Second, certain
physical movements can be difficult to perform or can endanger a woman or
her fetus, such as standing for long periods of time, stooping over, climbing
stairs or ladders, and lifting heavy objects." Finally, certain job conditions like
irregular hours, shift work, or psychological stress can have adverse effects on

9. Council on Scientific Affairs, Effects of Pregnancy on Work Performance, 251 JAMA 1995,
1997 (1984).
10. Working DuringPregnancy,U. MICH. HEALTH SYS., May 6, 2004, http://www.med.umich.edu/
llibr/wha/wha work_crs.htm; see also Fabrice Czarnecki, The Pregnant Officer, 3 CLINICS
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 641 (2003) (citing hazards to pregnant police officers, including
exposure to lead through contact with bullets, noise toxicity, and chemicals).
11. See Working During Pregnancy,supra note 10; see also Mayo Clinic Staff, Working During
Pregnancy: Do's and Don'ts, MAYOCLINIC.COM, July 6, 2007, http://mayoclinic.com/health/
pregnancy/WL00035 (recommending taking frequent breaks from standing and avoiding twisting while
lifting, among other modifications).
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Working the night shift, for example, appears to pose one of the

biggest risks to pregnant women.1 3 The greater the number of potentially

hazardous working conditions, the greater the likelihood of an adverse perinatal
outcome.1 4 Whether any of these conflicts exist, however, is a function not only
of the job itself,
but of the particular woman's condition and the stage of her
5
pregnancy.1
Not surprisingly, conflicts between pregnancy and work are more common
in jobs that include some physical component. One study, for example, found
evidence of increased risk of preterm delivery among electrical equipment
operators, janitors, textile workers, and food service workers, compared with
"markedly reduced" risk for teachers and librarians.'1 6 Litigation over light-duty
policies or other requested accommodations for pregnant workers suggest the

types of jobs in which these conflicts are prevalent: firefighting, law7
enforcement, trucking, and ground jobs with airlines, to name just a few.'
Pregnancy also may conflict with the job duties of many physically demanding,
female-dominated positions. Nurses, maids or housekeepers, cashiers, home
health care aides, and waitresses all work in occupations which require heavy
lifting or standing for long periods of time.' 8 Analysis of current data permits a
12. A study exploring the effect of ameliorating adverse conditions before a certain point in
pregnancy focused on six specific occupational conditions considered hazardous for pregnant women:
"night working hours, irregular or shift work, standing at least four hours daily, regularly lifting loads
weighing seven kilograms or more, noise, and a moderate or high level ofjob strain combined with little
on-the-job support." D. Hollander, Improving Work Situations During Pregnancy May Help Improve
Outcome, 32 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 156, 156 (2006); see also Maureen Hatch et al., Do Standing,
Lifting, Climbing, or Long Hours of Work During Pregnancy Have an Effect on Fetal Growth?, 8
EPIDEMIOLOGY 530, 535 (1997) (confirming the finding that "a shorter work week during pregnancy
appears to be advantageous for the fetus").
13. See, e.g., Claire Infante-Rivard et al., Pregnancy Loss and Work Schedule DuringPregnancy,4
EPIDEMIOLOGY 73, 74 (1993) (finding, based on a study of 331 pregnant women, that "women who
always worked evenings or nights were at a substantially higher risk of pregnancy loss compared with
women who were fixed day workers").
14. See Hollander, supra note 12, at 156 ("[T]he odds that an infant was small for gestational age
increased steadily with the number of risky conditions present at the beginning of pregnancy; they were
30% higher among women with 4-6 conditions than among those with none.").
15. See Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancyin the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1
(1995) (summarizing scientific research on the effects of pregnancy on women, fetuses, and job
performance).
16. David A. Savitz, Andrew F. Olshan & Kelly Gallagher, Maternal Occupation and Pregnancy
Outcome, 7 EPIDEMIOLOGY 269, 270 (1996) (studying effect of occupation on late pregnancy outcomes
based on data from the National Maternal and Infant Health Survey).
17. See, e.g., Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006) (long-distance truck
driver); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (airline ticketing agent); Adams v.
Nolan, 962 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 1992) (police officer); N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of
Human Rights, 581 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 1992) (city bus driver); Karen J. Kruger, Pregnancy &
Policing: Are They Compatible?: Pushing the Legal Limits on Behalf of Equal Employment
Opportunities, 22 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 61, 70-71 (2007) (describing the impact of pregnancy-related
physical changes on police officer's job duties).
18. See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (certified
nurse's assistant opposed seventy-five-pound lifting requirement); Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Tex.,
143 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1998) (licensed vocational nurse challenged 150-pound lifting requirement);
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conservative estimate that close to twenty-five percent of women in the U.S.
workforce hold physically strenuous jobs that may conflict with pregnancy.'9
The pervasive conflicts between pregnancy and work have been
compounded by two demographic shifts in recent decades. First, women have
joined the workforce in unprecedented numbers. By 1975, "nearly half [of
women] worked, more than [seventy] percent at full-time jobs. 20 Women's
workforce participation expanded in many directions-they began to work
more years of their lives and for more hours each week, with fewer
interruptions. Second, since the 1970s, the number of pregnant women who
work has steadily increased. 2' Surveys also show that women are working
longer into pregnancy than ever before. Of women in the 1961 to 1965 cohort
of one study who worked while pregnant, almost half stopped working at least
three months before childbirth, thirteen percent at least six months prior. In
contrast, among women in the 1996 to 2000 cohort in the same study, fiftyseven percent left work less than a month before delivery and only twenty-three
percent left at least two months before. 23 There is thus a marked long-term
trend towards greater workforce commitment by pregnant women.
Pregnant women's workforce patterns are not immune from the conflicts
discussed above. While difficult work situations are sometimes just suffered in
silence-women continue performing dangerous jobs or find ways to subtly
avoid activities made impossible by their physical condition-these conflicts
EEOC v. WinCo Foods, Inc., No. 05-0486, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64521 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006)
(grocery store clerk contested fifty-pound lifting requirement); see also Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp.,
Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1315-16 (1lth Cir. 1994) (citing expert witness testimony, in a pregnancy
discrimination case brought by a nurse, that "a pregnant employee is more susceptible to contagious
diseases" and there "also exists a risk that contagious diseases communicated to the mother will harm
the fetus"). Conflicts do turn up in other occupations, of course. See, e.g., Randy Cohen, Bad Yoga Pose,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 21 (considering the ethics and legality of a yoga
instructor certification body's refusal to permit pregnant women to be tested).
19. See CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ANNUAL AVERAGES:

HOUSEHOLD DATA 217, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat 1 .pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (calculating that
twenty-three percent of workers in "[p]roduction, transportation, and material moving occupations" are
women); Quick Stats 2007, supra note 1;see also Calloway, supra note 15, at 8-9 & tbl.I ("[T]hirtyeight percent of all working women labor in occupations where they may be unable to perform their job
during pregnancy without risking their health.").
20. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE

UNITED STATES 301 (1982).
21. For women with a first pregnancy between 1961 and 1965, only sixty percent had ever worked
for six or more months continuously and only forty-four percent worked during pregnancy, forty percent
full time. See JULIA OVERTURF JOHNSON & BARBARA DOWNS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MATERNITY
LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT: PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961-2000, at 3 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-103.pdf (reporting data from the U.S. Census Bureau's
Survey of Income and Program Participation, a nationally representative periodic survey); SMITH,
DOWNS & O'CONNELL, supra note 2, at 3-6. For women whose first pregnancy occurred between 1996
and 2000, however, seventy-four percent of them had worked for at least six months before becoming
pregnant and sixty-seven percent worked during pregnancy, fifty-seven percent fulltime. See JOHNSON
& DOWNS, supra, at 3.
22. JOHNSON & DOWNS, supra note 21, at 6.
23. Id.
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often have a direct impact on whether pregnant women remain in their current
jobs or in the workforce at all. Two effects are worth noting here. First,
pregnant women are more likely to discontinue work during pregnancy if they
hold jobs that include physical components or otherwise pose challenges to safe
pregnancy. For example, one study concluded that "strength requirements of
the job had a significant effect on exits from work., 24 Second, pregnant
women's workforce patterns vary significantly. Women with a college degree
were also more likely to work longer into pregnancy: sixty-four percent worked
within one month of childbirth, while only forty-six percent of women with less
than a high school degree worked that long. 25 The inverse correlation between
continuing to work and level of education suggests that pregnancy conflicts are
particularly acute for women in so-called "blue collar" or "non-traditional"
occupations, as well as for those in lower-wage, female-dominated jobs
involving physical labor.26 As the authors of one study suggest:
It also may be the case that jobs that require more education are more
conducive to accommodating pregnant women. Women working at
these jobs may be more likely to sit during the day, have easy access to
rest facilities, not engage in manual labor, and not be exposed to
hazardous materials or conditions. Also, their schedules may be more
flexible, allowing for ease of27 scheduling medical appointments, late
arrivals, and early departures.
Workers with the lowest earning power and the fewest job opportunities are
thus also the most likely to face conflicts between pregnancy and work.
Together, these data points reinforce the need for law to take account of the
physical effects of pregnancy. With more women in the workforce, more
women laboring in physically demanding jobs, and more women with the
economic need or desire to work more and longer during pregnancy, the
potential conflicts between pregnancy and work are increasing. Yet this is
where the law has focused the least.
II. THE LAW'S CURRENT RESPONSE TO PREGNANCY IN THE WORKPLACE
The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic change in the regulation of
pregnancy and work. Against a long history of exclusion and protectionist
policies that survived challenge, a new legal regime emerged to protect
pregnant workers against discrimination beginning in the 1970s.

24. Sonalde Desai & Linda J. Waite, Women's Employment During Pregnancyand After the First
Birth: Occupational Characteristics and Work Commitment, 56 AM. SOc. REv. 551, 560 (1991)
(reporting data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth).
25. See JOHNSON & DOWNS, supra note 21, at 4 (relying on data from 1996 to 2000).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
27. See JOHNSON & DOWNS, supra note 21, at 6.
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Before the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196428 and the
establishment of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for sexbased classifications, 29 states and private employers could discriminate against
women, whether pregnant or not, with impunity.
It remained common for employers in the 1960s and 1970s to overtly
impede pregnant women's access to new or continued employment, even as
women were gaining important statutory and constitutional protection against
sex discrimination. Though by that time there had been a tremendous influx of
women into the workforce, 30 many employers continued to refuse to hire
pregnant women, to require them to leave before a certain point in their
pregnancies, to exclude them from certain jobs, or to deny them fringe benefits
like insurance, disability coverage, or leave. This differential treatment of
pregnant workers somewhat surprisingly earned the Supreme Court's
imprimatur twice during the 1970s, in decisions holding that neither the Equal
Protection Clause 31 nor Title VII 32 prohibited discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy, even though both prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.
Three developments ushered in the modem era of pregnancy
discrimination law. First, despite refusing to find an equality-based
constitutional right against pregnancy discrimination, the Supreme Court in
1974 invoked the Due Process Clause to invalidate school district policies that
forced pregnant teachers to leave work at a fixed point during pregnancy,
regardless of their individual condition. In Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,33 the Court recognized the pregnant woman's right against being
conclusively presumed incapable by the mere fact of pregnancy, regardless of
her own individual capacity. This ruling remains good law, but its role was
quickly supplanted by broader-reaching statutory protection for pregnant
workers.
Constitutional rights ultimately figured only marginally in the development
of rights against pregnancy discrimination. The second, and more important
development, was the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of... sex." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
29. The Supreme Court began the movement towards heightened scrutiny in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971), and Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), before settling on "intermediate" scrutiny
for sex-based classifications in Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
30. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 20, at 301; see also NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF

WOMANHOOD (2d ed. 1997); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX
SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986).
31. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974).
32. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
33. 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating school district policies that forced women to stop working at
a particular point in pregnancy and prevented them from starting work until a particular point after
childbirth, regardless of their own capacity to work).
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(PDA), designed specifically to overrule the Court's ruling in GeneralElectric
Co. v. Gilbert.34 The Gilbert Court had ruled that pregnancy discrimination was

not actionable under Title VII, rejecting EEOC guidelines and the rulings of
every federal court of appeals to consider the question. 35 The PDA guarantees

eligible employees two substantive rights: (1) the right not to be treated
adversely because of pregnancy; and (2) the right to be treated the same as
other employees "not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work" with respect to all aspects of employment, including benefits such as
36
leave and insurance.
The first clause of the PDA is straightforward. It simply adds "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions" to Title VII's list of protected
characteristics, and thus permits pregnancy discrimination to be challenged

under any available theory of liability-formal policy, disparate treatment, or
disparate impact. 37 The proper interpretation of the PDA's second clause,
however, was a matter of dispute. In the early years after the PDA's passage,

feminists were divided over the proper approach. In two cases in the 1980s,
they split over whether to argue that the PDA prohibited employers from

treating pregnant workers more favorably than other temporarily disabled
employees. One coalition argued for an "equal treatment" interpretation of the
second clause, which would limit pregnant women to exactly the same rights as

other temporarily disabled workers-no more, no less. Another coalition
argued for an accommodation approach, which would permit employers to treat

pregnant women better than other temporarily disabled workers as necessitated
by the physical effects of pregnancy. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with
the latter group in CaliforniaFederalSavings & Loan Ass 'n v. Guerra, ruling

that, given the context in which the Act was passed, "Congress intended the
PDA to be a floor beneath which pregnancy disability
benefits may not drop-38
rise."
not
may
they
not a ceiling above which

34. 429 U.S. 125.
35. See id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 854-55 (6th
Cir. 1975); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1975); Gilbert v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F. 2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125; Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d
1089, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1975); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1975);
Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1975);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictionalgrounds,
424 U.S. 737 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975) (EEOC's pregnancy discrimination guidelines,
issued in 1972).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
37. Id. ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... ").
38. 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th
Cir. 1985)). In Cal. Fed., the Supreme Court considered whether a California law that required
employers to provide up to four months of unpaid leave for pregnancy- or childbirth-related disability
was preempted by the PDA. See id.
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Cal. Fed. thus stands for the proposition that states can mandate-or

employers can offer-protections for pregnant workers regardless of whether
they do so for other temporarily disabled workers. Together, the two clauses of
the PDA put an end, at least on paper, to employment policies and practices
that had explicitly or implicitly barred women from working through pregnancy
regardless of their individual capacity. It was these types of policies, in
Congress's view, that "have long-term effects upon the careers of women and

account in large part for
the fact that women remain today primarily in low39

paying, dead-end jobs."
The third notable development for pregnant workers was the adoption,
fifteen years after the PDA's enactment, of the Family and Medical Leave Act

of 1993 (FMLA), a gender-neutral law that provides eligible workers up to
twelve weeks' unpaid leave per year as needed to care for a newborn or newly
adopted child, to care for a seriously ill family member, or to attend to one's
own serious health condition. The FMLA protects pregnant women in two

ways. First, a pregnant woman can take "serious health condition" leave as
needed for prenatal care or if the pregnancy renders her unable to work. 4 1 This
leave can be taken intermittently if justified by medical necessity. 42 Second, a

woman can take FMLA leave as needed for childbirth and recovery, as well as
to care for a newborn child4 3
These three components-the due process right against presumed
incapacity, the PDA, and the FMLA-thus comprise federal pregnancy
discrimination law.a n Together they effected a reversal of course from an era of

39. See S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 6 (1977).
40. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612-2654 (2000)). To be
eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must have worked at least 1250 hours in the previous year for an
employer that has at least fifty employees within a seventy-five-mile radius of where the employee
reports to work. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(c) (2008) ("Circumstances may require that FMLA leave begin before the
actual date of birth of a child. An expectant mother may take FMLA leave ... before the birth of the
child for prenatal care or if her condition makes her unable to work."); id. § 825.114(a)(2)(ii) (defining
"serious health condition" to include "[a]ny period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal
care").
42. See id. § 825.117. An employee seeking intermittent leave must provide proof of medical
necessity and must attempt to schedule the leave in a way that least disrupts the employer's business.
The employer can reassign an intermittent-leave-taker to a position that is more suitable to the particular
schedule. Id.
43. See id. § 825.112(a)(l) (mandating that covered employers grant leave to eligible employees
"[flor birth of a son or daughter, and to care for the newborn child").
44. Most courts have ruled the Americans with Disabilities Act inapplicable to disability arising
from a normal pregnancy. See, e.g., Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970 (S.D. Iowa
2002); cf D'Andra Millsap, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A
Proposal To Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1411 (1996) (urging
application of the ADA to pregnancy-related disability). It is also important to note that an enormous
number of workers, many of them women, are not even protected by the federal statutory framework.
For example, domestic workers and individuals who work for small employers-both groups that are
disproportionately female-are excluded from the PDA's protection because their employers will not
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wide-ranging exclusion of pregnant women from the workforce to one in which
access is all but guaranteed. These rights operate more or less effectively,
however, depending on the actual work capacity of a particular woman, the
nature of her job, and the policies of the employer for whom she works.
III. THE CAPACITY-BASED MODEL OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
The constitutional and statutory framework described in Part II above
provides pregnant workers with important workplace rights. These rights,
properly understood, all revolve around a single axis: the pregnant woman's
capacity to work. We thus separate our analysis into the three possible states in
which a woman may find herself in during pregnancy: full capacity to work,
partial capacity to work, and little or no capacity to work. The legal regime
provides differing treatment of these three phases of capacity, with its least
effective aspects reserved for women with partial working capacity.
A. Full Capacity: The Right To Work
The key protection afforded by pregnancy discrimination law today is the
right not to be presumed incapable of work by the mere fact of pregnancy. In
other words, women have the right to be assessed individually for their ability
to work. Though this right came first under the Supreme Court's due process
ruling in LaFleur, in which the majority observed that "the ability of any
particular pregnant woman to continue at work past any fixed time in her
pregnancy is very much an individual matter, 4 5 more workers are protected by
the same right under the PDA. An employer "may not decide whether a
decision is
or
pregnant woman can assume
,46continue with a particular job (that
•
left to the pregnant employee).
This right against stereotyped incapacity was the central thrust of the PDA,
as the statute was designed to alter the assumptions most employers held about
the impact of actual and prospective reproductive behavior on women's
abilities. As the Senate Committee Report explained, "the treatment of pregnant
women in covered employment must focus not on their condition alone but on

meet the law's fifteen-employee minimum. Further, as discussed below, the FMLA leaves out millions
of workers, such as those who work part-time and cannot meet the 1250 annual hours threshold, those
who work for employers with fewer than fifty employees, and those who may be covered by the law but
need more than twelve weeks' leave or who simply cannot afford to take unpaid leave at all.
45. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974).
46. Time v. Publix Super Market, Inc., 89 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,854 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2007).
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the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work. '' 4 7 This right has
been limited in contexts where individual assessment has been deemed
impracticable, such as the airline industry, 48 but otherwise firmly enforced.
An essential corollary to the pregnant woman's right not to be presumed
incapable is the right to work if fully capable. Pregnant workers have the right
under the PDA not to be singled out for adverse treatment, so long as they are
capable of working on the same terms as all other fully capable workers. An
employer cannot bar pregnant women from working, whether due to animosity
towards them or a desire to protect them from potential hazards. The concept of
pregnancy-blindness captures this right: An employer can treat the pregnant
woman as well or as badly as it treats anyone else, as long as it is blind to her
pregnancy as an independent variable.
Fetal protection policies, under which employers barred women from jobs
that were potentially hazardous to fetal development, challenged the principle
that pregnant women have the right to work if capable. In UA W v. Johnson
Controls,Inc., 49 however, the Supreme Court invalidated a policy that excluded
pregnant or fertile women from jobs at a battery manufacturing plant that
involved lead exposure. The court ruled that actual or potential risk to a
woman's fetus is not an aspect of her capacity to work for purposes of the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination. The presence of fetal danger, in other words, was insufficient to
make women's sterility a BFOQ. "It is no more appropriate for the courts than
it is for individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is
more important to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress has
left this choice to the woman as hers to make." 50 This ruling cemented the right
of "capable" pregnant women to work on equal terms and reinforced the notion
that stereotypes about pregnant women's abilities and employers' unilateral
decisions about how best to promote maternal or fetal health are no longer
permissible.
B. Limited or No Capacity: The Right To Leave Under Some Circumstances
For some women, pregnancy renders them unable to work at all or unable
to perform the essential functions of a job. Imagine a woman employed in a job
47. S. REP. No. 95-331, at 4-6 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 6 (1978) (emphasizing that
"mandatory leave for pregnant women arbitrarily established at a certain time during their pregnancy
and not based on their inability to work" would no longer be permitted).
48. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 675 (1980) (upholding forced
leave policy for pregnant flight attendants because pregnant attendants are more likely than nonpregnant attendants to be impaired during an emergency due to fatigue, nausea, vomiting or
miscarriage).
49. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
50. ld.at211.
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that cannot be done remotely or electronically who is put on bed rest because of
pregnancy complications. What rights, if any, does the law provide for her
during this period?
There are two possible benefits a woman in this situation might seek: job
security upon return and salary and benefits during a leave of absence. The
PDA grants her an absolute right to neither of these benefits, but a comparative
right to both. Under Cal. Fed., employers are required to treat employees who
are unable to work because of pregnancy at least as well as employees disabled
due to other reasons, but "similar in their ability or inability to work. '' 51 This
principle extends to the provision of leave and other benefits. A pregnant
employee could thus end up with generous leave and benefits for a pregnancyrelated disability either because the employer generally accommodates all
temporary disabilities well, or because the employer decides to offer leave for
pregnancy-related disability even without offering similar benefits to other
temporarily disabled employees. But in both cases, pregnant employees live at
the whim of their employers. The PDA provides a "floor" rather than a
"ceiling" on benefits for pregnant workers, but the "floor" is not absolute. 52 An
employer can be meager with its provisions for all forms of temporary
disability, pregnancy included. This voluntary accommodation model
exacerbates the gap between privileged and less-privileged women, since highincome jobs are more likely to come with benefits. Large law firms, for
paid maternity
example, recently moved en masse to provide eighteen weeks of 53
time.
first
the
for
leave
adoption
provide
to
and
lawyers
for
leave
Disparate impact theory might provide some protection against the harshest
leave policies. It showed early promise in some of the first post-PDA cases
challenging no-leave policies. 54 In the case that first divided feminists over the
proper treatment of pregnancy and accommodation, the Montana Supreme

51. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 n.6 (1987).
52. Compare this with Title IX, which requires some absolute accommodations for pregnant
students, including student-athletes. See Deborah L. Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete and the
Promiseof Title IX, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323 (2008).
53. See Amanda Bronstad, Law FirmsAcross U.S. Are Boosting Paid Leave, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17,
2008; see also Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2007) ("Workers who benefit most from the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, in
terms of ability to take medical leave related to childbirth, are women who work for employers that offer
paid temporary disability leave or a generous sick leave policy to all workers. Most often, such leave is
available to women in higher-paying jobs.").
54. See, for example, Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union, in which the court reversed
summary judgment for the employer on the validity of ten-day maximum leave policy that fell
"considerably short of the period generally recognized in human experience as the respite needed to bear
a child." 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court remanded the case for a determination of the
need for such a policy. Id. Similarly, the court in EEOC v. Warshawsky denied summary judgment
where the policy required new employees to work for one year before eligible for sick leave. 768 F.
Supp. 647, 654 (N.D. II1. 1991) ("Because only women can get pregnant, if an employer denies adequate
disability leave across the board, women will be disproportionately affected.").
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Court ruled that the Miller-Wohl Company's policy of providing no leave for
the first year of employment had a disparate impact on women.55 The
regulations promulgated by the EEOC concerning Title VII's interpretation

endorse this approach, as well. 56 But, in the last decade, similar no-leave
57
policies have been upheld by other courts, including appellate courts.

Disparate impact theory thus seems to be far from a certain source of rights,
58
even as to the most draconian leave policies.
The most meaningful protection for a right to leave during periods of

pregnancy-related incapacity is the FMLA, which supplements the PDA by
granting eligible employees an absolute right to leave in certain
circumstances. 9 If eligible for leave under the FMLA, pregnant women must
be allowed to take medically necessary leave, including intermittent leave, for
pregnancy-related disability. However, while the FMLA was hard-won and
provides an important supplement to the PDA and other federal anti-

discrimination laws, it has serious gaps. Nearly forty percent of American
workers are not eligible for FMLA leave, 6 1 and many of those who are eligible
cannot afford to take unpaid leave. In FMLA surveys, the most common reason
62
employees give for not taking available leave is the inability to afford it.
Moreover, of particular relevance to pregnant workers, the total leave available
under the FMLA is limited to twelve weeks per year, regardless of the duration
of the circumstance necessitating the leave or the occurrence of a second

55. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984). Additionally, in
Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant on a disparate impact claim challenging a rule barring employees from using
sick leave and maternity leave consecutively, but gave an important caveat: "This is not to say that a
policy which does not provide adequate leave to accommodate the period of disability associated with
pregnancy might not be vulnerable under a disparate-impact theory of liability under Title VII." 939
F.2d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 1991).
56. See 2 EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL app. 626-B (1975) [hereinafter EEOC MANUAL]
("Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy
under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate
impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity." (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1604.10(c) (1983))).
57. See Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding, against
a disparate impact challenge, a policy limiting leave within the first ninety days of employment to three
days); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2000).
58. The EEOC, however, continues to take a more expansive view of the disparate impact theory's
applicability in the pregnancy context. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 56, § 626.2(a) ("Although [29
C.F.R.] § 1604.10(c) addresses the issue of adverse impact only in the context of terminations, adverse
impact may also exist with regard to other policies or practices (for example, granting different benefits
based on job classifications).").
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
60. On the history and structure of the FMLA, see Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without
Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17 (2004).
61. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS 3-2 to 3-3

(2000) (reporting survey results from 1995 and 2000).
62. See id. at 2-16 (reporting that 77.6% of those who needed leave listed this as one of the reasons
for not taking leave).
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covered circumstance. Thus, a woman who is forced to take FMLA leave
during pregnancy because her employer will not provide any accommodations
for her temporarily altered capacity, a problem discussed below, will often
exhaust her total allotment, leaving nothing for childbirth, recovery, or infant
care. The twelve weeks may not even be enough to get her through the
remainder of pregnancy. The gaps in the FMLA are thus exacerbated by the
substance of pregnancy discrimination law, which fails to provide a right to
reasonable and necessary accommodation. Efforts to expand the FMLA have
been frequent, but so far unsuccessful.63 Leave laws in some states, however,

supplement the federal protections; several64 have passed family and medical
leave laws that are broader than the FMLA.
C. PartialCapacity: The Right to Necessary Accommodations?

As discussed above, the law provides one set of rights for pregnant women
who have not suffered any work-related incapacity and another, more limited
set, for those who are fully incapacitated. The fully capable woman is entitled
to be assessed as such and to work on equal terms with other capable workers.
Conversely, the FMLA's grant of unpaid leave is primarily premised on a
woman's total inability to work, and, if applicable, permits temporary absence
until such time as she can resume working at full capacity.
But what about the pregnant woman who is temporarily unable to perform
some or all of her assigned job duties, yet wants or needs to continue working
through her pregnancy? Millions of women labor in physically demanding jobs
that may not be consistent with the realities of pregnancy-from doctorimposed restrictions on heavy lifting to concerns about exposure to hazardous
materials. 65 The predicament of these women reveals the most significant gap
in the coverage afforded by the PDA's capacity-based model.66 We examine
63. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, H.R. 1369, 110th Cong. (2007).
64. State laws sometimes offer longer or more frequent periods of leave, or make leave available in
a greater range of situations. See NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, STATE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE LAWS THAT ARE MORE EXPANSIVE THAN THE FEDERAL FMLA, http://www.nationalpartnership

.org/site/DocServer/StatesandunpaidFMLLawspdfdoclD=968 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
65. Of course, conflicts between work and pregnancy are not limited to women who perform
physical labor. All pregnant women are at risk for conditions such as morning sickness that may
diminish their ability to function at full capacity and lead to lateness, absenteeism, and other disruptions
at work.
66. As one commentator has observed: "The message to pregnant employees is that pregnancy is
perfectly acceptable, so long as their productivity does not suffer. This standard seems somewhat
unreasonable given the physical demands of even the most typical pregnancies." Jessica Carvey
Manners, The Search for Mr. Troupe: The Need To Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct Cases, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 215 (2005) (citation omitted); see also Julie Manning
Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct, 38 AM. BUS. L.J.
819, 826 (2001) ("[O]nly those women who experience no illness, no changing biological requirements,
and require no time to give birth to their child or recover from giving birth are protected by the PDA.").
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here the problem of women in need of some work modification--colloquially,
light duty-because of the physical effects of pregnancy, the legal gaps they
encounter, and a solution that may hold promise for practitioners.
1. The Need for Light Duty
Consider the following scenarios:
A police officer who is approximately fourteen weeks pregnant asks
her department to relieve her from patrol duties and provide a lightduty assignment for the remaining six months of her pregnancy, on the
advice of her doctor. The department refuses, claiming to reserve light
duty for officers injured in the line of duty. The officer's only choice is
to work full duty in violation of her medical restrictions or take an
unpaid leave of absence. She takes the leave. So as to have some
income during this period, she uses up the eighty-four days of accrued
paid vacation and sick time she had planned to use during her
maternity leave. She also goes without pay for another several weeks.
During her leave, she does not accrue seniority on the job. The officer
and her husband also must sell their condominium because they are
unable to make the mortgage payments. She uses up her FMLA leave
before her baby is born.
A baggage handler for a major airline requests light duty when she is
eight weeks pregnant, after her doctor restricts her from lifting more
than twenty pounds. The airline refuses, on the grounds that it reserves
light duty for workers injured on the job. Rather than disregard her
doctor's orders, the baggage handler decides to take a leave of absence.
As a result, she exhausts all her accrued vacation and sick time, as well
as her FMLA leave. She also does not accrue pension credit during this
time. She is unable to make mortgage payments and faces other
financial hardships. Because she experiences complications from her
C-section, she is unable to begin working full duty for several weeks.
By the time she returns to her job, it has been more than a year since
she has received a paycheck.68

67. This describes the experience of Sandra Lochren, a Suffolk County, New York police officer
who sued the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) based on its adoption of a "no light duty
except for on-the-job injury" policy. See Lochren v. County of Suffolk, No. 01-3925, 2008 WL 2039458
(E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008). She and five other officers successfully sued the SCPD under disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories. Julia C. Mead, Central Islip: Jury Finds Police Policy
Discriminatory,N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at B7.
68. Angie Welfare, a freight service clerk for American Airlines, is currently pursuing a pregnancy
discrimination claim before the New York District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. She is represented by Legal Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund) and attorney Deborah Karpatkin. See Affidavit, Welfare v. Am. Airlines, Charge No. 520-2006
-02955 (EEOC Aug. 14, 2006), available at https://www.quickbase.com/up/bdy472as8/g/ri7/ebr/va/Wel
fare%20FINAL%20amended%20charge.doc (Ms. Welfare's EEOC charge).
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A park police officer who is less than two months pregnant receives a
light duty instruction from her doctor, and requests such an assignment
from her chief. Although the chief is willing to reassign the officer,
county management denies the officer's request, stating that light duty
only is available for officers injured on the job. As a result, the officer
is forced out of work and must use up three months' worth of accrued
sick, vacation, and personal leave time, followed by nine more months
of unpaid leave through the end of her pregnancy and her postchildbirth recovery. During her time off work, the officer does not
accrue69 seniority or retirement credit. She also uses up her FMLA
leave.

These stories, drawn from recent or pending cases,70 vividly illustrate the
severe consequences for pregnant women who are unable to work at full
capacity and are forced off the job. There is no dispute that pregnancy caused
these women's limitations, nor is there dispute that their employers knew that
these women would suffer if light duty was denied. Yet under the current PDA
framework, 7' these women, and others like them, still face a variety of
obstacles to challenging such adverse outcomes.

69. This vignette describes the case of Tara Germain, a Suffolk County Park Police officer whose
duties mirror those of officers with the police department, including making arrests and breaking up
physical altercations, and who must wear a bulletproof vest and heavy gun belt. The officer is
represented by attorney Janice Goodman and her case is pending in federal court. Despite the 2006
verdict in the Lochren case, described above, the Park Police continues to distinguish between on- and
off-the-job injuries and illnesses in granting light duty. See Germain v. County of Suffolk, No. 07-2523
(E.D.N.Y. filed June 23, 2007).
70. Cases like the ones described above are cropping up nationwide. The ACLU of Michigan
recently filed suit against the Detroit Police Department, challenging the department's light-duty policy
under disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Paul Egan & George Hunter, 5 Cops Allege
Pregnancy Bias, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, at 2B. Legal Momentum, and its co-counsel the Sugar
Law Center, also currently represent a firefighter in Port Huron, Michigan, who hid her pregnancy and
continued working full duty until she was five months pregnant because she predicted her light-duty
request would not be granted, and she feared the financial consequences of taking unpaid leave. See
Affidavit, Finn v. City of Port Huron (EEOC Dec. 22, 2008), available at https://www.quickbase.com/
up/bdy472as8/g/m2/ebr/va/Affidavit.pdf (Ms. Finn's EEOC charge); see also Tova Perlmutter & Gillian
Thomas, Editorial, Port Huron FirefighterBattles for Workplace Justicefor All Women, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Jan. 28, 2009.
71. A handful of states have passed statutes mandating light duty in some circumstances. See, e.g.,
CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (2005) (requiring employers who have a practice of accommodating
temporarily disabled employees with light-duty assignments to make such assignments available for
employees with a pregnancy-related disability); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7)(E) (2004) (defining
discriminatory practices to include the failure or refusal "to make a reasonable effort to transfer a
pregnant employee to any suitable temporary position which may be available in any case in which an
employee gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or pregnant employee
reasonably believes that continued employment in the position held by the pregnant employee may
cause injury to the employee or fetus"); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(H) (2001 & Supp. 2008)
(prohibiting employers from refusing light-duty assignments to pregnant law enforcement officers and
firefighters "where that transfer can be reasonably accommodated"); TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. §
411.0079 (Vernon 2005) (requiring "reasonable efforts to accommodate" a law enforcement officer with
partial physical restriction because of pregnancy and requiring transfer to a light-duty position upon
medical necessity if one is available). The public outcry following press coverage of the Detroit police
officers' legal challenge prompted the introduction of similar legislation in Michigan. See Paul Egan,
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There are two common policies that force pregnant women to quit or take
leave during pregnancy despite not being fully incapacitated: a policy that does
not make light-duty or alternative assignments available to anyone, and a policy
that makes light-duty assignments available only for certain workerstypically, those injured on the job. In either case, pregnant workers are denied
accommodation for temporary disability caused by pregnancy. Recent litigation
suggests, however, that many employers have shifted to the latter type of
policy, which may be driven, among other forces, by an employer's desire to
minimize or eliminate workers' compensation liability for an injured worker.72
As we explore below, different theories of discrimination available under
Title VII and the PDA present unique challenges in the pregnancy context, but
also, in some cases, may hold untapped potential. The challenges come in part
from the existing statutory language, but also from a combination of crabbed
judicial interpretations and practitioners' under-utilization of existing theories.
There is no doubt that the PDA could be amended to provide more robust
protection for a pregnant woman's right to work, but there is room as well to
push for greater protection within the existing statutory framework.73
2. DisparateTreatment and the "SimilarlySituated" Trap

With respect to pregnancy-related disability, the PDA grants pregnant
women two basic rights that are relevant to light-duty requests. The first clause
of the act prevents an employer from basing any decision whether to grant or
deny such a request on pregnancy itself, just as it would be impermissible to
base a decision on an employee's race or national origin. A woman can thus not
be denied a light-duty assignment simply because pregnancy, as opposed to any
other condition or injury, occasions the request. The second clause specifically
requires equal treatment with a defined comparison group-workers who are
temporarily disabled by causes other than pregnancy, but "similar in their
ability or inability to work.'

74

In other words, the PDA grants a comparative

Work Urgedfor Pregnant Cops, DETROIT NEWS, June 6, 2008, available at http://detroitnews.com/apps/

pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080606/METRO/806060360/104I/LIFESTYLE04. The most recent version of
the bill passed the Michigan House by a vote of ninety-nine to one in March 2009 and is pending in the
Senate.
72. See, e.g., Federal Employee Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (2006). The act

provides that federal employees injured on the job are entitled to full compensation regardless of ability
to work, but must accept any "suitable work" offered. Id. § 8106(c).
73. See Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies
for Vindicating the Civil Rights of "Carers," 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 31,42-50 (2006).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). See generally Daniela M. de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA:
Congress Must Give Birth to Accommodation Rights That Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17

COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2008) (discussing how different courts interpret the PDA to accommodate
employees experiencing temporary pregnancy-related limitations).
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right of access to accommodations, like light duty, which are necessitated by
the disabling effects of pregnancy.
When mounting a disparate treatment challenge to the denial of light duty
by an employer with no light-duty policy, a plaintiff must show through direct
or circumstantial evidence that her employer intentionally discriminated against
her. Armed with evidence that pregnancy was a motivating factor for the
denial, the plaintiff could proceed under the "mixed-motive" proof structure
first recognized by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins75 and
later codified with modifications by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Without
such evidence, the court will instead apply the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting approach to tease out proof of intentional discrimination. 77 Using this
proof structure, a plaintiff first must make out a prima facie case of
discrimination, showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was qualified for the job in
question; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.
The burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for its action. 78 Finally, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to79prove that the defendant's stated reason is a pretext for
discrimination.
In the pregnancy context, this mode of analysis tends to invite the search
for a similarly-situated comparator-a temporarily disabled worker who was
granted an accommodation that was denied to the pregnant worker. Finding
such a person can help show a violation of the first clause-that the denial was
because of pregnancy-or of the second clause's guarantee of a comparative
right of accommodation. There are two obvious problems with this approach.
First, the very structure of the statute relies on the male norm as the baseline for
benefits-that is, pregnant women are guaranteed only those benefits that are
also granted non-pregnant employees. Yet, the needs of pregnant workers are
likely to differ in significant ways from the needs of workers disabled by other
causes. Second, the uniqueness of the burdens, which unquestionably exist
"because of" the employee's sex but do not afflict her co-workers-makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to identify employees "similar in their ability or
inability to work." 80 Although showing favorable treatment of a comparator is
75. 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e.5(g)(2)(B).
77. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

78. Id.
79. Id. at 804.
80. One commentator has suggested that an appropriate corrective would be to shift to the employer
the "burden of locating an appropriate comparative," once the plaintiff has established that the
"particular trait or event on which the employer is basing the action is... due to the pregnancy." Judith
G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant
Women in the WorIforce, 50 ME. L. REv. 225, 252 (1998).
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not the only way to prove disparate treatment under Title VII, 81 courts tend to
treat it as such in the pregnancy context. Without an identified comparator who
received light duty, a woman's request for accommodation often is deemed a
request for "special treatment," which the PDA does not expressly require. This
approach makes it virtually impossible for a pregnant woman to mount a
disparate treatment challenge to a facially gender-neutral policy, absent
some
82
evidence that the policy was applied selectively or otherwise unequally.
The barriers posed by the comparator model for PDA claims are
demonstrated nowhere better than in Troupe v. May Department Stores Co. 83 In
Troupe, a pregnant department store saleswoman was fired for excessive
tardiness and attendance problems caused by her severe morning sickness. In
affirming summary judgment on Ms. Troupe's disparate treatment claim, Judge
Posner observed:
[Ms. Troupe's] lawyer argues with great vigor that she should not be
blamed [for her tardiness]-that she was genuinely ill, had a doctor's
excuse, etc. That would be pertinent if Troupe were arguing that the
[PDA] requires an employer to treat an employee with morning
sickness better than the employer would treat an employee who was
equally tardy for some other health reason. This is rightly not argued..
.. [N]othing in Title VII requires [an] employer to keep [an] employee
on the payroll [if she cannot work because of illness]. . . . We must
imagine a hypothetical Mr. Troupe, who is as tardy as Ms. Troupe was,
also because of health problems, and who is about to take a protracted
sick leave growing out of those problems at an expense to Lord &
Taylor equal to that of Ms. Troupe's maternity leave. If [the employer]
would have fired our hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies that it fired
Ms. Troupe not because she was pregnant
but because she cost the
84
company more than she was worth to it.
Pregnant plaintiffs' inability to put forward a "hypothetical Mr. Troupe"
similarly has doomed disparate treatment claims by pregnant women penalized
under workplace policies ranging from productivity standards8 5 to rules
81. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court made clear that showing that a plaintiff was treated
differently than a "similarly situated" co-worker was just one way to prove an employer's discriminatory
intent, not the exclusive way. 411 U.S. at 804. Relevant evidence sufficient to show pretext includes
"facts as to the (defendant's] treatment of [plaintiff] during his prior term of employment; [defendant's]
reaction, if any, to (plaintiff's] legitimate civil rights activities; and [defendant's] general policy and
practice with respect to minority employment," including statistics, although evidence concerning
favorable treatment of similarly-situated employees would be "especially relevant." Id.
82. Professor Judith Greenberg has provided a comprehensive survey of this problem. Greenberg,
supra note 80, at 240-47.
83. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir, 1994).
84. Id. at 737-38; see also Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000).
85. See Centeno v. Macy's Corporate Servs., Inc., No. 07-1199, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49679, at
*14-*15 (D.N.J. June 30, 2008) (upholding a practice where pregnant department store merchandise
scanner was not excused from productivity standards absent evidence others with medical restrictions
were excused from those standards).
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86
concerning treatment of hospital patients with communicable diseases.
Unsurprisingly, then, disparate treatment claims arising from denial of light
duty where the employer's policy does not provide such accommodation to any
87
other temporarily incapacitated employee have met the same fate.
But what about cases in which the employer has a policy affording light
duty to some employees, but restricts such assignments to those injured on the
job-a definition that automatically excludes pregnancy? A strong argument
can be made that such policies constitute per se disparate treatment under the
PDA, because there unquestionably are workers "similar in their ability or
inability to work" who receive a job benefit expressly denied to pregnant
women. In this view, the second clause of the PDA augments the basic antidiscrimination prohibition in the first clause by dictating the appropriate
comparison group. If the law is to revolve around capacity-an approach that,
as outlined above, leaves many needs of pregnant working women unmet-at a
minimum it should be true to its word and treat equally capable workers with
equal regard. A policy that excludes pregnant women despite their potentially
similar work capacity is, in effect, a formal policy of discrimination. Although
this per se discrimination theory was unsuccessful in the one appellate case in
which it was argued, 88 litigators should continue to insist that courts give effect
to the PDA's express focus on the extent of capacity, and reject employers'
artificial distinction concerning the location where the incapacity arose.
The majority of disparate treatment challenges to light-duty policies
distinguishing between occupational and non-occupational injury have relied
on pretext analysis using the McDonnell Douglas framework, with decidedly
mixed results. When confronted with a putatively gender-neutral policy of
granting light duty only for those workers injured at work, courts have
interpreted the PDA's second clause to pregnant women's detriment, rather
than to their benefit. Instead of treating capacity as the only appropriate basis
for differentiation among temporarily disabled workers, they permit employers
to draw other, arbitrary lines as long as the lines themselves do not precisely
86. See Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding firing of
pregnant nurse for refusing to treat HIV-positive patient with meningitis, where she could not show
other nurses also would not have been fired for refusing to perform such work).
87. See, for example, Tysinger v. Police Department, 463 F.3d 596, 575 (6th Cir. 2006), which
upheld summary judgment for the defendant where pregnant police officer could point to no other
officer who had sought light duty. The court noted that "Tysinger is not to be faulted for asserting her
physician-prescribed need for restricted duty.... This interest [in her fetus' health] undeniably deserved
and arguably even demanded her preferential treatment. However, the law, rightly or wrongly, does not
extend this preferential obligation to the employer." Similarly, Dimino v. New York City Transit
Authority granted summary judgment where a pregnant officer denied restricted duty could not produce
"evidence support[ing] [her] claim that she was denied a right granted to others, i.e., restricted duty." 64
F. Supp. 2d 136, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
88. See Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Swift's policy cannot be
viewed as [per se or] direct evidence of discrimination because the Act merely requires employers to
'ignore' employee pregnancies.... Swift's light-duty policy is indisputably pregnancy-blind.").
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differentiate between pregnant and non-pregnant workers. This line-drawing
occurs at one of two possible stages in the McDonnell Douglas analysis: when

the plaintiff tries to establish the prima facie case, or when the employer offers
a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its action. At the first stage, courts
have held that a pregnant worker denied light duty under an "on-the-job injury
only" policy could not satisfy the second prong of McDonnell Douglas because

she was not "qualified" for the position itself8 9 or for the benefit sought under
the existing employer policy. 90 Either conclusion is question-begging at best,

since both assume the validity of the underlying policy denying pregnant
women light-duty assignments.
At this same stage, and even more troubling, courts have held that a

pregnant worker does not satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas-that is, failing to show circumstances that suggest
discrimination, because the plaintiff cannot point to a "similarly situated"
person who was treated more favorably. Here, courts make a clear mistake, by

assuming that only workers who were injured off the job are "similarly
situated" to pregnant women, even though the PDA says nothing about the

source of injury or illness when mandating the comparison to those "similar in
their ability or inability to work." This analysis nullifies the burden-shifting
analysis altogether, by assuming the validity91 of an on-the-job/off-the-job
distinction in order to ward off a challenge to it.
Ruling against a light-duty plaintiff at the prima facie stage is a particularly
damning mistake. Of course, reaching the pretext stage is the goal for any

plaintiff, but particularly for a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment pursuant to
a putatively neutral employer policy (as opposed to a single employment

decision by a single decision maker, which is informed by numerous
circumstantial variables and susceptible to individual bias). Any opportunity to
introduce evidence concerning the discriminatory intent underlying the policy

itself or its application in practice is crucial. Persuading a court to conduct a

89. See, for example, Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., which noted with respect to the second
prong of the McDonnell Douglas test: "There is no dispute that Appellant was no longer qualified to
work as a nurse's assistant. The lifting restriction imposed on Appellant clearly prevented her from
performing the responsibilities required of this position." 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11 th Cir. 1999); see also
Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583.
90. See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the
district court's finding that the plaintiff failed to show she was "qualified for transfer into a light-duty
position, i.e., that she sustained a work related injury" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. See id. at 208 ("As long as pregnant employees are treated the same as other employees injured
off duty, the PDA does not entitle pregnant employees with non-work related infirmities to be treated
the same under Continental's light-duty policy as employees with occupational injuries."); see also
Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313 (noting, with respect to the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas, that the
"correct comparison is between Appellant and other employees who suffer non-occupational disabilities,
not between Appellant and employees who are injured on the job").
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proper "similarly situated" analysis at the prima facie stage is therefore of
critical significance.
The proper analytical blueprint for prima facie analysis in light-duty cases
is found in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon. 92 There, the
court rejected an employer's argument that the plaintiff could not meet her
prima facie burden because a policy reserving light duty for workers injured on
the job did not raise an inference of differential treatment. The court ruled that
it was inappropriate to limit the universe of "similarly-situated" employees to
those injured off-the-job. Rather, it is incapacity that makes a comparator
"similar" to a pregnant woman, not the location where the incapacity arose. As
the court explained:
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he second
clause [of the PDA] could not be clearer: it mandates that pregnant
employees 'shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes' as nonpregnant employees similarly situated with respect to
their ability to work. "' As such, the PDA explicitly alters the analysis
to be applied in pregnancy discrimination cases. While Title VII
generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the employee who
received more favorable treatment be similarly situated "in all
respects," the PDA requires only9 that
the employee be similar in his or
3
her "ability or inability to work.
The court thus rejected the employer's argument that the plaintiff had not met
her prima facie burden.
Although the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits expressly refused to follow
Ensley-Gaines, the Tenth Circuit has suggested, without expressly holding, that
light-duty plaintiffs should be compared to all temporarily disabled employees
for purposes of meeting their prima facie burden. 94 In EEOC v. Horizon/CMS
HealthcareCorp., the court stated:
92. 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996).

93. Id. at 1226 (citation omitted); accord Villanueva v. Christiana Care Health Servs., No. 04-258,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4760, at *14 n.4 (D. Del, Jan. 23, 2007) (finding that a pregnant patient care
technician denied light duty established a prima facie case even though her medical restrictions differed

from those of employees granted light duty); Sumner v. Wayne County, 94 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (finding that a police officer fired for violating department's no-leave policy for

probationary employees after taking time off to give birth was "similarly situated" to male officer
granted longer probationary period after sick leave for on-the-job injury; both were "temporarily
disabled while on probation"); see also Jamie L. Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy
Discrimination at Work: Interpreting the PDA To "Mean What It Says," 86 IOWA L. REv. 703, 724-33
(2001) (explaining that reasoning of Ensley-Gaines is grounded in the text and legislative history of the

PDA).
94. It should be noted that the "similarly situated" landscape for all employment discrimination
claims recently changed with the Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in Sprint/United Management Co.
v. Mendelsohn, 128 S.Ct. 1140 (2008), which may broaden the universe of employees deemed "similar
in their ability or inability to work" in PDA claims. In Mendelsohn, the Court considerably expanded the
potential universe of comparators in employment discrimination claims. Id. at 1147 (in ADEA claim
arising from company-wide reduction in force, coworkers could be appropriate comparators even if they
worked outside plaintiffs organization and/or were supervised by different managers); see also, e.g.,
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If a plaintiff is compared only to non-pregnant employees injured off
the job, her case would be "short circuited" at the prima facie stage..
. The better approach would be to hold that a plaintiff has satisfied the
fourth element of her prima facie case by showing that she was95treated
differently than a non-pregnant, temporarily disabled employee.
In Horizon/CMS,the court went on to find genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the employer had adopted the policy with the express purpose of
denying light duty to pregnant women, in part because the employer could
produce no evidence in support of its stated rationale for adopting the policy:
cost savings. 96 Additionally, the plaintiffs in at least one recent case
successfully convinced a jury that the on-the-job restriction
was a pretext for
97
discrimination against pregnant law enforcement officers.
Even if courts permit plaintiffs to advance to the pretext stage when
challenging restrictive light-duty policies, however, the plaintiffs still face an
uphill battle. At this stage, courts re-invoke the line-drawing error described
above by treating a light-duty policy with an on-the-job restriction as a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for denying light-duty requests by
pregnant workers, which means, in effect, that the policy can only be
invalidated upon a showing of pretext. Courts may apply, in essence, a
presumption of legitimacy to an employment decision premised on an
ostensibly "neutral" policy.
A recent Sixth Circuit case, Reeves v. Swift TransportationCo.,98 illustrates
this erroneous judicial response to a disparate treatment challenge. Amanda
Reeves was an over-the-road truck driver for Swift. On her application for a job
driving a truck, Reeves wrote that she could lift seventy-five pounds and carry
that weight for fifty-six feet, and that she could lift sixty pounds over her head.
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: The Supreme Court Appears To
Have Punted on the Admissibility of "Me Too" Evidence of Discrimination.But Did It?, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 264 (2008), http://colloquy.law.northwestem.edu/main/2008/04/sprintunited-ma.html.

95. 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.7 (1Oth Cir. 2000). Moreover, the court pointedly stated that comparator
evidence is just one way of making out a case for disparate treatment: "Nothing in the case law in this
circuit requires a plaintiff to compare herself to similarly-situated co-workers to satisfy the fourth

element of her prima facie case. A plaintiff alleging discrimination in violation can satisfy the fourth
element of her prima facie case in a number of ways," Id, at 1195 n.6, In Adams v. Nolan, in which a
pregnant police officer challenged the department's denial of light duty, the court found that male police
officers granted light duty were appropriate comparators at the pretext stage, even though they needed
those assignments for a shorter term than the plaintiff requested. 962 F.2d 791, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1992)
("Plaintiff and [the male officers] were similarly situated in the critical sense that all four sought lighter
work assignments than their regular patrol duties as a result of physical impairments that were unrelated
to their jobs.").
96. Horizon/CMS, 220 F.3d at 1198.
97. See Joanna Grossman, A Big Win for Pregnant Police Officers. A Jury Finds a New York
County's Police Department Liable for Failing To Accommodate Pregnancy-Related Disability,
FINDLAW'S WRIT, June 27, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20060627.html (describing
the jury verdict in Lochren v. County of Suffolk, No. 01-3925, 2008 WL 2039458 (E.D.N.Y. May 9,

2008)).
98. 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006).
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She was hired, but in her first three months on the job, she never, in fact, had to
unload a truck herself (or carry anything weighing seventy-five pounds). After
her first three months of work, Reeves discovered she was pregnant. Her doctor
wrote a note restricting her to "light work," and indicated that she should not
lift more than twenty pounds. When she showed the note to her employer, her
supervisor said they had no "light work" for her to do and sent her home. The
company then continued to deny her daily requests for light work, citing its
injuries merited light-duty assignments, and
policy that only on-the-job
99
eventually fired her.
Reeves sued Swift under the PDA, advancing a disparate treatment theory.
After first rejecting Reeves's contention that the light-duty policy was per se
discriminatory, the court turned to its McDonnell Douglas analysis. It assumed
without deciding that Reeves had met her prima facie burden, 0 0 and then
assessed whether she could show that Swift's legitimate business reason for
firing her-its "pregnancy blind" light-duty policyl t l-was a pretext for
discrimination. Because Reeves had not introduced any evidence that Swift
adopted its on- versus off-the-job policy as a way to deny pregnant women
light duty,10 1302 the court concluded that Swift was entitled to summary
judgment.
Most circuits have not yet ruled on the validity of light-duty policies with
on-the-job injury restrictions. But Reeves should sound a warning to litigants
that in addition to vigorously advocating for a proper "similarly situated"
analysis at the prima facie stage, 1°4 they also must focus their efforts on
building a case of pretext. This would include an examination of how the policy
came to be enacted and why-such as whether the policy was announced in
close temporal proximity to an employee's pregnancy (or cluster of employees'
pregnancies)-and how the employer justifies the policy's business purpose.
Also potentially relevant is evidence about women's status generally within the
employer's ranks--especially among the ranks of decision makers-as well as
evidence reflecting whether women are relatively new arrivals to a particular
workplace or are subject to stereotyping in job assignment or other ways. To
the extent permitted by the practitioner's state's ethics rules, extensive
interviews should be conducted among current and past employees about

99. Reeves was not entitled to FMLA leave because she had worked for Swift for too few hours to
be eligible. Id. at 638-39.
100. The court thus sidestepped Ensley-Gaines by limiting its comparison-group analysis to the
pretext stage of the case. Id. at 641 n.1.
101. Id. at 641-42.
102. Id. at 642.
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
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employer attitudes concerning pregnancy or women in the workplace and its
05
consistency in applying the policy.'
But even if plaintiffs can prevail on a showing of pretext, as a group of
female law enforcement officers did in a recent case, 10 6 the conclusions reached
in Reeves reflect a fundamental and disturbing misunderstanding about the
nature of the rights guaranteed by the PDA. In Reeves, like prior cases from
other circuits,' ° 7 the court classified the plaintiffs claim as a demand for
"preferential treatment." By permitting the employer to pick and choose among
temporarily disabled workers, the court fundamentally misconstrues the
structure of the PDA. Under such an analysis, the employer gets to choose the
relevant comparison group on which to premise pregnant women's "neutral"
treatment, as long as the choice is not animated by discriminatory intent. The
PDA, however, does not delegate to employers the right to define appropriate
analogues to workers temporarily disabled by pregnancy-it provides one in
the statute itself: "[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes ...as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work .... 108 The comparative right of accommodation under the
PDA is already minimal; permitting employers to undermine it, as the court did
in Reeves, contravenes Congress' clear intent to focus on the actual effects of
t0 9
pregnancy on working capacity when defining discrimination.
3. DisparateImpact: Untapped Potential
Commentators long have expressed optimism that the disparate impact
model holds potential for PDA claimants in dismantling the workplace's "latent
exclusionary bias" against pregnancy.' 10 At its best, disparate impact analysis

105. See also Williams & Westfall, supra note 73, at 45-50.

106. See infra text accompanying notes 118-119 (discussing Lochren v. Suffolk County, No. 013925, 2008 WL 2039458 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008)).
107. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Appellee,

however, was under no obligation to extend this accommodation to pregnant employees. The PDA does
not require that employers give preferential treatment to pregnant employees." (emphasis added));
Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Urbano's claim is thus not a request for
relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for preferentialtreatment; it is a demand not satisfied by
the PDA." (emphasis added)).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
109. See supra text accompanying note 47.
110. Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct of 1978, 94
YALE L.J. 929, 939 (1985); see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimimation and Accommodation, 115

HARV. L. REV. 642, 660-65 (2001). Indeed, many advocates continue to urge even broader use of the
theory, such as in cases involving breastfeeding, discrimination in the "virtual" workplace, and even
assisted suicide. See Michael Selmi, Was the DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 704 nn.12-13 (2006) (noting large number of commentators who have urged broader use of
disparate impact theory).
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exposes the link between policies enacted against the norm of a male worker
functioning at full physical capacity and the exclusionary results when such
policies are applied to the frequent, predictable, and unique event of pregnancy.
Moreover, it permits plaintiffs to avoid resorting to artificial comparisons
between pregnant women and those "similar in their ability or inability to
work."
Dispiritingly, although the disparate impact model has been used by a
handful of courts to invalidate some oppressive employer policies related to
pregnancy, and although the EEOC continues to embrace it as a viable tool,
courts frequently decry the model as a backdoor route to "preferential" or
"special" treatment for pregnant women.111 Of course, this characterization
could not be more inaccurate; the central purpose of the disparate impact model
is to remedy a neutral policy's hidden "preferential" treatment of historically
favored groups by eliminating the "built-in headwinds"" 2 the policy imposes
upon minority groups-unless an employer can show the policy is justified by a
job-related business necessity that cannot be satisfied by alternative means.
Specifically, a prima facie case of disparate impact requires a plaintiff to (1)
identify a specific employment practice having an adverse impact on a
protected class and (2) provide evidence sufficient to show a causal link
between the practice and the adverse impact. 113 An employer must then show
that the "challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity. ' 114 Even if a defendant succeeds in making
this showing, a plaintiff still can prevail if she can point to an alternative policy
that would serve the employer's needs while avoiding the adverse impact.15
Although disparate impact theory has been largely ineffective in giving
pregnant women access to an accommodation enjoyed by none of their coworkers-such as by creating an exception to an employer's absenteeism
policy solely for women afflicted by pregnancy symptoms like morning

11. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming
summary judgment against plaintiff who made disparate impact challenge to her firing under employer's
absenteeism policy after she took leave to recover from miscarriage); Sussman v. Saxon, 153 F.R.D.
689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("This Court recognizes the Supreme Court's opinion that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was not intended to provide accommodations to pregnant employees when such
accommodations rise to the level of preferential treatment."); see also Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing disparate impact as a "permissible theory" under the PDA,
but cautioning that, "properly understood," it was not a "warrant for favoritism" and could not be used
to prevent employers from treating pregnant workers "as badly as they treat similarly affected but
nonpregnant employees").
112. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
113. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1977).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
115. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975).
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sickness' 6-it is relatively untested in challenging light-duty policies that
117
distinguish between occupational and non-occupational injury or illness.
What case law there is on the subject suggests that such claims might encounter
more success.
a. Lochren v. County of Suffolk: A Win for Disparate Impact
A key reason for optimism is the recent victory achieved in 2006 by a
group of female police officers in Suffolk County, New York. In Lochren, six
plaintiffs challenged the County's implementation in April of 2000 of a lightduty policy that provided such assignments only for occupational injuries. A
jury ultimately returned verdicts in the plaintiffs' favor on both disparate
treatment and disparate impact grounds. The plaintiffs presented evidence not
only of the County's selective enforcement of the policy-namely, numerous
instances in which the County had granted light-duty assignments to male
officers with non-work-related injuries and illnesses-but also that, prior to the
new, exclusionary policy, pregnant women had
used light duty in statistically significant higher proportions, compared
to their total numbers on the force, than the overall force used sick
light duty: approximately 6.1 percent of women on the nearly-2,000
officer force used light duty for pregnancy each year, by comparison,
slightly over 1.2 percent of the total number of officers118
used light duty
for other off-the-job illnesses and conditions each year.
The court accepted, without discussion, that a disparate impact claim against
the County's policy was appropriate, and that the harm to the women officers9
was statistically significant enough to withstand summary judgment."
Plaintiffs ultimately went on to persuade a jury in their favor on both disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims.

116. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting disparate impact claim because the decision to deny leave was a discretionary
decision, rather than an employment practice).
117. Indeed, challenges to light-duty policies where no such positions are available to any
employee have met a similar fate as claims seeking exceptions to absenteeism or no-leave policies. See
Dimino v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 64 F. Supp. 2d 136, 157-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Here, Dimino's
disparate impact claim is based on the premise that the facially neutral policy of not providing restricted
duty to any medically limited police officer has a disparate impact on pregnant women. The only
remedy for such a problem would be either the creation of a restricted duty assignment either for all
employees or for pregnant women. Both solutions would seem to violate the underlying assumption of
equality over favoritism or allowance."). Notably, however, the Dimino court went on to observe that
"disparate impact analysis might be appropriate for a more narrowly tailored policy-for instance, one
that penalized internal illness more than external injury." Id. at 158; see also Stout v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir. 2002).
118. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 11, Lochren v. County of Suffolk, No. 01-3925 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2004).
119. Memorandum and Order at 5, Lochren, No. 01-3925 (Mar. 29, 2005).
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b. Other Courts Have Left the Door Open
No court has categorically rejected the use of the disparate impact model as
an appropriate vehicle for challenging an employer's light-duty policy that
distinguishes between on- and off-the-job injuries and medical conditions.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit in Reeves signaled that disparate impact theory might
be the preferable vehicle for such a challenge: "Pregnancy-blind policies of
course can be tools of discrimination. . . . The legal theory Reeves has
chosen--disparate treatment-requires her to allege and prove discriminatory
intent." 120 Moreover, several courts have ruled expressly that the plaintiffs
prima facie burden of producing evidence of a "statistically significant" adverse
impact may be considerably relaxed in the light-duty context, given
pregnancy's demonstrable physical effects. 12 ' This is crucial, given the
difficulty of amassing and analyzing statistical data, particularly in fields
historically dominated by men, where women may comprise a small proportion
of the workforce-or where the plaintiff literally might be the only female
employee in the workplace.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue more than a decade ago in Garcia v.
Woman's Hospital of Texas (Garcia 1)122 . In GarciaI, a nurse who had taken a
brief sick leave due to pregnancy complications was told by her employer
hospital that, in order to return to work, she would have to be cleared for full
duty.1 3 Because Ms. Garcia's doctor had issued a restriction that she could not
"push, pull, lift, and support over 150 lbs," and because the hospital also had a
policy of restricting sick leave to six months (which would run out prior to Ms.
Garcia's due date), the hospital discharged her.1 4 At trial, the court granted the
hospital's Rule 50 motion on disparate treatment grounds, but did not consider
12 5
the disparate impact theory.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Ms. Garcia should have be given the
opportunity to present evidence that the 150-pound lifting restriction imposed
on her had a discriminatory disparate impact on pregnant women. In doing so,
120. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2006).
121. See cases cited infra notes 127-128. Two courts have dismissed disparate impact challenges
on the grounds that the plaintiff presented insufficient statistical evidence. See Spivey v. Beverly
Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11 th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff, a certified
nursing assistant, did not introduce any statistics showing the light duty policy's effect); Urbano v.
Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 205 n.l (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting without discussion the district court's
dismissal of plaintiff airline ticket agent's claim; district court found plaintiff's statistics insufficient
where court limited her evidence to policy's effect on "similarly situated" employees, that is, those
injured off the job). But see EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1196 (10th Cir.
2000) (criticizing Urbano as having improperly applied disparate treatment framework to disparate
impact claim).
122. 97 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 1996).
123. Id. at 811.
124. Id. at 812.
125. Id. at 813.

2009]

Making Pregnancy Work

the court expressly rejected the notion that Ms. Garcia could succeed only if
she could present statistics documenting the restriction's effect:
She must ... prove causation,... and for this needed testimony to the
effect that the 150-pound lifting requirement would cause pregnant

women as a group to be forced onto unnecessary medical leave and,
because of the six-month limit on medical leave, to be terminated. It

would, of course, be insufficient for a claim under Title VII if Garcia
were the only pregnant woman adversely affected; she must show that

pregnant women as a group would be subject to this medical
restriction. If all or substantially all pregnant women would be advised
by their obstetrician not to lift 150 pounds, then they certainly would
be disproportionately affected by this supposedly mandatory job

requirement for [nurses] at the Hospital. Statistical
26 evidence would be
unnecessary if Garcia could establish this point.1
The court thus remanded the case to the trial court so that Ms. Garcia could
127
produce the requisite expert testimony.
Another court considering a disparate impact challenge to a light duty

policy took an even more generous approach, requiring only a de minimis
showing of adverse impact. In Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of Sag
Harbor,128 the Sag Harbor Police Department's first and only woman was
denied light duty after she became pregnant. 29 In ruling that Laura Lehmuller
satisfied the second prong of her prima facie case, the court apparently
accepted as undisputed the fact that pregnancy's biological limitations would

126. Id. Notably, the court reached this conclusion despite the lack of any evidence that any other
employees-such as those injured on the job-were excused from the lifting requirement. For that
reason, it remains the most expansive pronouncement to date about the disparate impact theory's
application in the light-duty context.
127. Id. Unfortunately, on remand, Ms. Garcia's expert "testified that she could not accept the
potential legal liability associated with saying that any woman could lift 150 pounds, whether pregnant
or not." Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Tex. (Garcia I1), 143 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1998). Despite this
idiosyncratic result in Ms. Garcia's specific case, however, the Fifth Circuit's pronouncement about the
necessary evidentiary showing for a PDA disparate impact challenge remains sound. See, e.g., Stout v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding, despite rejecting plaintiff's
disparate impact claim for exception to absenteeism rules, that a lifting restriction would be appropriate
for disparate impact challenge, as directed by Garcia 1); cf Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 205
n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding without discussion that the district court properly granted summary
judgment on plaintiff-airline ticket agent's disparate impact claim). It should be noted that the Urbano
court's disparate impact analysis has been criticized for improperly conflating the "similarly situated"
analysis of a disparate treatment claim with the disparate impact model. See EEOC v. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1196 (10th Cir. 2000) ("For this reason alone, Urbano is
unpersuasive.").
128. 944 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
129. Id. at 1089-90. As a result of the Department's denial of light duty, Ms. Lehmuller continued
working her normal patrol duties until she was approximately three months pregnant, when she
sustained a back injury on the job that entitled her to light duty under the Department's policy. Id. at
1090.
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necessitate light duty for most or all 30pregnant police officers, without requiring
any further proof of adverse impact.'
This looser evidentiary burden in the light-duty context is consistent with
courts' analyses of other disparate impact claims where women's biological
difference is the reason for a policy's allegedly discriminatory effect.' 31 Courts,
for example, have dispensed with rigorous statistical proof requirements in
cases concerning a police department's exclusive use of guns with a large grip
unsuited to a woman's average hand size, 132 a fire department's physical agility
test,1 33 and an electrical company's failure to provide adequate restroom
facilities for a woman worker. 134 Indeed, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,135 the
130. Id. at 1090 ("Lehmuller has shown that the Village adopted a light-duty policy that has an
adverse impact on pregnant officers."). Pleadings in the case do not reveal that the plaintiff submitted
any statistical analyses or expert reports in opposition to the Department's summary judgment motion,
appearing to confirm that the court relied on Lehmuller's experience as well as settled facts concerning
pregnancy's physical effects.
131. One commentator recently noted other potential sources of support for this position, drawn
from contexts other than employment. See de laPiedra, supra note 74, at 286, which cited Planned
Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996), as indicating the "Supreme Court's recognition of inherent [biological and
reproductive] differences between the sexes that should allow for, if not mandate, the legal provision of
accommodations to pregnant employees."
132. E.g., Pumphrey v. City of Coeur D'Alene, No. 92-36748, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892 (9th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1994). Pumphrey relied on the plaintiffs expert witness testimony and "common sense" to
conclude that "this facially neutral practice would have a significantly discriminatory impact upon
women, whose hands on average are smaller than men's [hands]." Id. at *3.The court expressly rejected
the defendant city's contention that because only three women patrol officers worked on its police force,
the plaintiff could not make the requisite statistical showing. "Statistics are ... only one factor that may
assist a plaintiff in establishing a discriminatory impact case. Therefore, a plaintiff is not precluded from
making a prima facie case on the basis of other evidence. Plaintiff in this case has done so by showing
she was terminated because she failed to meet a facially neutral requirement that could be expected to
have a disparate impact on women because of an identifiable physical difference." Id. at *4-*5 (citations
omitted).
133. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999). In affirming the judgment in
favor of a woman applicant, the court concluded that pass rate statistics drawn from sample of seven
women test-takers, coupled with expert witness testimony about the test's deficiencies, "comfortably
tip[] the scales in favor of the district court's finding of disparate impact." Id. at 475.
134. DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000). In DeClue, Judge Posner rejected
the claim of a female lineman that her employer's failure to provide restroom facilities on a worksite
constituted sexual harassment. 223 F.3d at 436. However, he explained in dicta that the failure to
provide restroom facilities on a construction site plainly had a disparate impact on women, by virtue of
accepted, widely-held societal attitudes concerning acceptable feminine behavior.
[I]nsofar as absence of restroom facilities deters women (normal women, not merely women
who are abnormally sensitive) but not men from seeking or holding a particular type of job,
and insofar as those facilities can be made available to the employees without undue burden
to the employer, the absence may violate Title VII. We need hardly add that women are not
"unreasonable" to be more sensitive about urinating in public than men; it is as neutral a fact
about American women, even though it is a social or psychological rather than physical fact,
as the fact that women's upper-body strength is on average less than that of men, which has
been held in disparate-impact litigation to require changes in job requirements in certain
traditionally male job categories.
Id. (citations omitted); accord James v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 02-3915, 2005 WL 6182322, at
*4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005) (upholding the jury verdict for a lone female machine operator on a
twelve-person "work gang" who alleged that the unisex bathroom facility had a disparate impact on her;
although statistics may be needed to show disparate impact "where the impact of the prohibited conduct
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seminal disparate impact case concerning physical difference, the Supreme
Court found that a disparate impact challenge to a prison's height and weight
be premised on "generalized national statistics"
requirements for guards could 36
about male and female bodies. 1
Given the foregoing authority, practitioners are well-advised to utilize the
wealth of statistics about the number of women who can be expected to become
pregnant during their working lives-often more than once-as well as the
extensive literature concerning pregnancy's physical effects.' 37 Indeed, the
disparate impact theory is especially well-suited to PDA challenges in the
male-dominated work environment, where employer policies were undeniably
constructed without any thought as to their impact upon pregnant women
because, simply put, there were no women there to think about. When
challenging light duty policies distinguishing between occupational and nonoccupational injury and illness, it should be noted that, not only do women face
the predictable medical event of pregnancy, they also are equally at risk for the
"off-the-job" medical conditions that their male colleagues face-from car
accidents to cancer. Put differently, to the extent that women are forced to
exhaust all of their sick, vacation, and/or FMLA time because they are not
permitted to continue working during pregnancy, they are in a worse position to
weather any other off-the-job period than their male colleagues, who might
have the cushion of paid sick or vacation leave, or the guaranteed twelve weeks
of unpaid leave afforded by the FMLA. Further, women forced off the job due
to pregnancy also face the very real possibility that they will exhaust their
twelve weeks of FMLA benefits before even giving birth-making them
vulnerable to discharge for absenteeism while still pregnant.
Even if plaintiffs clearly satisfy the prima facie requirement in these cases,
it is unclear how they will fare at the next stage: business necessity analysis.
Upon a proper statistical showing, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
prove that its policy bears a "manifest relationship to the employment in

is diffuse, widespread or otherwise difficult to detect," statistics were not needed where jury could
reasonably conclude that women had a greater need for privacy and were more affected by unsanitary
conditions, such as feces-smeared toilet seats); see also Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 387-89 (6th
Cir. 1987) (reversing judgment for the employer on a female construction worker's claim of inadequate
restroom facilities; confirming that "the plaintiff was not required to prove her case by statistics," and
that disparate impact caused by "[a]natomical differences" was remediable under Title VII).
135. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
136. Id. at 330. Of course, Dothardis a double-edged sword for practitioners challenging physical
requirements in a male-dominated work environment. The Court went on to conclude that sex was an
appropriate basis for excluding women from "contact" positions in the facility, based on generalized
notions of male prisoners' propensity for violence against women and women guards' ability to defend
themselves. Id. at 335.
137. See supraPart I.
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Most likely, cost will be at least one

stated rationale offered by many employers, but that justification, standing
alone, generally is not sufficient under Title VII. 139 Indeed, to the extent that

the employer must replace the absent pregnant worker with a temporary
employee or farm her duties out to her co-workers, there is the very real

possibility that the employer's costs will increase, such as through the
obligation to pay overtime to overburdened workers. 140 When cost justifications
are raised, employers should be required to produce evidence of the cost

savings achieved by denying light duty to pregnant women.
Failure to do so
41
also may be used against them as evidence of pretext.1

Employers may also object to the feasibility of providing light-duty work
for all temporarily disabled employees on the grounds that there simply is not
enough "real" work to go around, and that they will be forced to create "makework" assignments.142 However, countless employers nationwide have avoided

this problem through a variety of means. All workplaces, even physically
strenuous ones, have tasks that are consistent with various physical limitations.
Effective, nondiscriminatory policies contain specific examples of the kinds of
tasks that fall under the light-duty rubric; in this way, employers are
encouraged to be proactive in identifying a universe of suitable, productive
tasks and in keeping a record of their availability. 143 Human resources
138. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997-98 (1988). Practitioners are welladvised not to permit employers to conflate these two criteria; a policy may be related to the job in
question, but not necessary to the business.
139. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971) ("While considerations
of economy and efficiency will often be relevant to determining the existence of business necessity,
dollar cost alone is not determinative.").
140. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Lochren put forward evidence of increased overtime costs in rebutting
Suffolk County's cost-cutting defense. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, supranote 118, at 14.
141. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (although "cost or other burdens" of alternative policy is relevant
to deciding whether it is equally effective to disputed policy, "[t]he same factors would also be relevant
in determining whether the challenged practice has operated as the functional equivalent of a pretext for
discriminatory treatment"). In EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., the court denied summary
judgment to the employer on a pregnancy discrimination claim based in part on its failure conduct a
"formalized study of the cost savings purportedly associated with" its policy, its failure to "articulate the
economic factors justifying the" policy, its inability to "explain how the [p]olicy reduced workers'
compensation costs," and its "lack of inquiry into the costs and/or cost savings of extending the ...
[p]olicy to include employees injured off the job" as factors supporting pretext finding. 220 F.3d 1184,
1198 (10th Cir. 2000).
142. Of course, as this Article makes clear, pregnant women are not analogous to individuals who
became sick or were injured off the job; consequently, it is possible to advocate that an employer's
policy be amended merely to extend the light-duty policy only to pregnant women-not all temporarily
disabled employees. Such a policy would be perfectly legal under Cal. Fed., as long as the eligibility for
alternate duty is tied to the actual period of physical disability. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
143. In a model light-duty policy drafted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, for
example, the policy lists several potential tasks "drawn from a range of technical and administrative
areas," including report review, special projects, filing and other clerical functions, desk assignments
such as booking officer or bookkeeping, and taking reports from colleagues or complaints from the
public. IACP NAT'L LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY CTR., TEMPORARY LIGHT DUTY: MODEL POLICY 2
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professionals advocate maintenance of such "task banks," and tout the many
benefits to the employer-tangible and intangible-when temporarily disabled
workers maintain a productive role in the workplace. 144 Finally, employers may
contend that if light-duty positions are open to all employees, regardless of how
they came to be temporarily disabled, there is increased potential for
malingering. Of course, imposing a reasonable time limitation on light-duty
assignments, such as one year, offers a straightforward solution to this
problem. 145 Time limits would also free up light-duty assignments to be used
serially by a larger number of employees as needed on a short-term basis.
Plaintiffs can use proposals like this at the final stage of disparate impact
analysis-when they have an opportunity to show that a proven "business
necessity" could be accomplished in a less restrictive way at the same cost.
Armed with these and other alternative approaches to light duty, plaintiffsand, one hopes, the courts-will prompt employers to examine the various
ways in which conflicts between pregnancy and employment are caused by the
workplace, rather than by characteristics of particular workers, and how easily
and cheaply accommodations can often be made. The potential for disparate
impact theory in this context is clearly untapped.
CONCLUSION

The context in which pregnant women today face the workforce has
changed considerably since the 1970s, when the law of pregnancy
discrimination was first established. Title VII helped opened doors for working
women, and the PDA expanded access for pregnant women specifically. But
there is more work to be done. The law's emphasis on capacity has stymied the
development of legal or employer norms of accommodation. The reality is that
the physical effects of pregnancy produce conflicts for working women either
by making aspects of their work impossible, or by forcing them to choose
between maternal and fetal health and their jobs. As increasing numbers of
women enter higher paying, historically male-dominated fields involving
physical labor, these conflicts will only become more widespread.
As we have shown, claims for workplace modifications, such as light-duty
assignments, have met with mixed success. Disparate treatment plaintiffs often

(1996). The model policy also provides that the department's "personnel authority shall maintain an
inventory of available job assignments that may be used for temporary light duty." Id.
144. See Bus. & Legal Reports, Inc., Steps for Cutting Workers' Comp Costs (June 26, 2003) (on
file with authors); Lisa Higgins, Bus. & Legal Reports, Inc., Returning from Disability with
Transitional-Duty Task Banks (Sept. 9, 2002) (on file with authors).
145. The Lochren plaintiffs made a persuasive case for this alternative in successfully opposing
Suffolk County's motion for summary judgment on the disparate impact claim. See Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law, supranote 118, at 16.
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stumble in the search for a comparator, or in the attempt to show why lightduty policies that exclude some non-pregnant workers nonetheless discriminate.
Disparate treatment challenges to policies that restrict light duty to those
injured at work often fail because courts view a policy that distinguishes based
on the location where the injury or illness arose as pregnancy-blind, and
therefore valid. Litigators must educate the courts that such an employercreated distinction violates both the letter and the spirit of the PDA and should
not be accepted at face value.
The results of disparate impact challenges to light-duty policies have also
been mixed, in part because courts refuse to apply genuine disparate impact
analysis in the pregnancy context for fear of mandating "preferential
treatment," and in part because this theory has been insufficiently utilized by
litigators. However, disparate impact doctrine is largely untested in the area of
light duty. Yet, it may be precisely the right analysis for situations in which
longstanding workplace structures and job definitions conflict with the genuine
biological difference of pregnancy. At a minimum, the law should be structured
to inspire a reevaluation of those aspects of jobs and the workplace that were
built around the prototypical male worker-one whose innate abilities and
capacities are not affected by reproduction.
The light-duty cases provide a concrete illustration of the Hobson's choice
faced by pregnant women in certain types of jobs-work at full capacity
despite the hazards or contraindications or go on leave, often with no pay-and
the failure of the law and courts to mitigate it. The law should account for the
variation in the physical effects of pregnancy and the temporary, often minimal
employer accommodations that would enable more pregnant women to keep
their jobs and continue providing for their families.

